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links to a “moral voice” of women. This stance has been criticised as being essen-
tialist and reinforcing gender stereotypes. This article, however, argues that the con-
cept of an ethic of care could be a creative way of approaching ethics in a complex
social system. Its position is supported by arguments from deconstruction discourses.
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[T]here is a point or limit beyond which calculation must fail, and
we must recognize that ... [a] democracy or a politics that we simply
calculate, without justice and the gift, would be a terrible thing, and
this is often the case.
Jacques Derrida (Derrida & Caputo 1997: 19)
Carol Gilligan’s controversial In a different voice: psychological theoryand women’s development (1982) (hereafter In a different voice) waswritten largely to challenge the claims of Lawrence Kohlberg
in The philosophy of moral development.1 Kohlberg (1981) argued that
there are six stages of moral development, and that women do not
“fully develop” to the sixth stage. The crux of Gilligan’s argument is
that there is more than one “moral voice”: there is also an “ethic of
care” that can be contrasted with the “logic of justice” which Kohlberg
views as the highest level of moral development.
Gilligan’s thesis of an “ethic of care” has been criticised, some-
times viciously, for being essentialist and reproducing the very ste-
reotypes that feminism aims to challenge. In this article, however, it
will be argued that Gilligan’s concept of an ethic of care could be an
interesting way of viewing ethics within society as a complex system.
Before going any further, two points should be made. First, the
understanding of ethics in this article follows Drucilla Cornell (1992:
13) seeing it as the quest for a non-violative relationship with the Other.
This understanding of ethics places a renewed emphasis on choice
and responsibility. It demands more than merely following rules or
calculating “correct” ethical behaviour. Rather, it demands decision-
making, choice and, most importantly, taking responsibility for those
choices.
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1 Carol Gilligan received her doctorate in social psychology from Harvard Uni-
versity in 1964. In 1970 she worked as a research assistant for Lawrence Kohl-
berg, whose work she would later criticise. She published her most famous work
In a different voice: psychological theory and women’s development in 1982. She taught
at Harvard University and the University of Cambridge and was closely involved
with the founding of the Harvard Center on Gender and Education. She is cur-
rently a full-time professor at the New York University.
Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg is known for his research on moral development,
specifically his “stage theory”. He received his doctorate from the University of
Chicago and, until his death in 1987, taught at Harvard University, where he
founded the Center for Moral Education.
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Secondly, an important role will be played by the concept of
“complexity”, and specifically the idea that society can be viewed as
a complex system.2 In such systems an enormous number of indivi-
duals interact constantly in a rich and dynamic way. The importance
of seeing society as a complex system — instead of as a chaos that
needs to be ordered — is that it recognizes and gives importance to
the multitude of contingent relationships that exist in society and to
the dynamic interaction between these relationships. Thus there is a
move away from an overemphasis on universal issues to an “apprecia-
tion” of the singular. There is no abstract a priori position from which
we can accurately describe a complex system, no “god’s-eye-view”.
Since there are no “objective” descriptions available, we cannot escape
assuming responsibility for the way in which we describe these sys-
tems. This responsibility cannot be shifted to some set of rules or
laws, or onto institutions (Cilliers 1995: 131). To underestimate or
disregard complexity is not simply a technical error, but an ethical
mistake.
1. Gilligan’s argument
Gilligan’s (1982) argument is two-fold. Firstly, she refutes Kohlberg’s
(1981) contention that women’s moral development is insufficient.
Kohlberg identifies six phases in a moral development that moves
gradually from an egocentric to a (more) universal understanding of
ethics where the principles used to make moral judgments are uni-
versal and abstract in nature. According to Kohlberg, the highest
level of moral development is achieved once ethics and ethical decision-
making are freed from historical and psychological constraints, in
other words, concreteness and particularity. Gilligan refers to this
understanding of ethics as “the logic of justice”. In contrast to this
understanding of ethics, she argues that there is also an “ethic of care”.
Whereas the logic of justice emphasises the application of abstract
rules and principles (by the autonomous individual), the focus of the
ethic of care is on relationships and the interdependence between
human beings in specific contexts. Gilligan challenges “the logic of
justice”, in other words, an abstract and universal idea of justice. She
2 Cf Cilliers 1998 for more detail.
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proposes an alternative, namely, the ethic of care — an understanding
of justice that takes both concrete aspects and singularity seriously.3
Gilligan illustrates the difference between the male and female
approaches to moral problems with her famous “Heinz example”
(which was also used by Kohlberg). The following story is told to two
eleven-year-olds, Jake and Amy. A man, Heinz, has a wife who has a
life-threatening illness. He cannot afford the medicine to save her
and is confronted with the choice of whether or not to steal the drug
from the pharmacist (Gilligan 1982: 25-6).
Jake argues as follows. A human life is worth more than the finan-
cial loss that the pharmacist will suffer; Heinz’s wife will die unless
she gets the drug, whereas the pharmacist can always make more mo-
ney. Heinz’s wife can never be replaced, therefore he is justified in
stealing the drug (Gilligan 1982: 26). Jake makes a logical argument
that there is no doubt about the fact that Heinz should steal the
drugs; the “solution” to the dilemma is obvious to him. It involves a
calculation of competing rights, and of placing these rights in a par-
ticular hierarchy. He reduces the problem to terms of rights and pro-
perty. He then ranks the values at stake (the right to life versus the
right to property) and selects the ranking value.
In contrast to Jake’s quick answer, Amy is not convinced that
there is an easy solution to the dilemma (Gilligan 1982: 27-9). She
argues that, even given Heinz’s situation, stealing remains wrong.
She is very concerned with the pharmacist’s failure to respond to
Heinz’s dilemma. She has some hope in the fact that “if [they] talked
long enough, they could reach something besides stealing” (Gilligan
1982: 29). Her focus is, therefore, not the competing rights, but the
concrete situation of the dilemma and the relationships between the
people described in it. To her, the pharmacist’s right to property and
transaction is less important, not only because the life of Heinz’s wife
3 In terms of feminist theory, Gilligan belongs to the second phase of feminism.
First-phase feminism argued simply for the equal treatment of men and women,
in other words, for formal equality. Second-phase feminism argued that there
are differences between genders and that these should be taken seriously. There
are two schools in this phase: dominance theory, of which Catherine MacKinnon
is the main advocate, and relational feminism, in which Gilligan is an important
figure (Van Blerk 1996: 177-9).
  
is at stake (the importance of her right to life) but also, and more im-
portantly, because the pharmacist is a party to a relationship with
Heinz and his wife (Gilligan 1982: 33). Furthermore, Amy is also
concerned with the unforeseen consequences — even when doing
“the right thing” — that Heinz’s actions might have. He might be
arrested for the theft and go to jail, leaving his wife with no one to
care for her (Gilligan 1982: 28). In other words, Amy sees the world
as composed of relationships between people rather than as a system
of rules, competing rights and hierarchical values.
Gilligan summarises the difference between Jake’s and Amy’s in-
terpretations of the dilemma as follows. Jake, who, according to Kohl-
berg’s model, is morally more developed than Amy, sees the dilemma
as a “math problem with humans in it” (Gilligan 1982: 28). Amy, on
the other hand, places the emphasis on the relationships. She sees the
world as “comprised of relationships rather than of people standing
alone, a world that coheres through human connection rather than
through systems of rules” (Gilligan 1982: 29). Individuals are defined
not as atomistic and separate, but as “delineated through connection”
(Gilligan 1982: 33). Whereas Jake sees the problem as an impersonal
conflict of claims to be mediated by systems of rules and law, Amy
places her trust in relationships and communication (Gilligan 1982:
32, 33).
Gilligan’s conclusion is that there is more than one “voice” when it
comes to moral problems. That which Kohlberg discards as “under-
development” is in fact a “different voice”; in what Kohlberg labels
a weakness, Gilligan finds a new and richer understanding of morality
— or, from Derrida and Cornell’s perspective, a richer understanding
of ethics. The “different voice”, in contrast with the logic of justice,
moves the emphasis from the abstract values of universality, logic and
detachment, to a emphasis on relationships, care and responsibility.
Gilligan (1983: 40) writes:
[W]hereas justice emphasizes the autonomy of the person, care un-
derlies the primacy of relationship [... t]hus justice gives rise to an
ethic of rights, and care engenders an ethic of responsibility.
To summarise, the ethic of care develops from an emphasis on re-
lationships and on the interdependence between human beings. It
values these connections and contextual thinking, whereas justice
5
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emphasises the autonomous individual (Gilligan 1982: 46). The
logic of justice (as in the case of distributive justice) places emphasis
on rights and formal equality; the ethic of care focuses on responsibi-
lity and respect (Gilligan 1982: 164-5).
Both these concepts (“ethic” and “care”) need to be considered more
carefully. Firstly, ethic/s should not imply a set of rules that must be
followed. Cornell (1992: 13) argues that ethics is the quest for a non-
violative relationship with the Other and Otherness in general. It as-
sumes, in Cornell’s (1995: 78) view, a “responsibility to struggle
against the appropriation of the Other into any system of meaning
that would deny her difference and singularity”. Any understanding
of care should take serious cognisance of the fact that control of the
Other is dangerous for ethical reasons. Care should rather imply a
play of nearness and distance; a relationship in which participation is
not a declaration of mastery (White 1991: 101). At this point another
aspect of this understanding of ethics, as formulated by Halie (1984:
37), becomes important:
If ethics is about ethos, the character of a particular person, why
shouldn’t it be deeply involved in using the particular names of
people in the context of their particular doings and sufferings? And
why shouldn’t we use the verbs of narratives in these contexts instead
of using only the empty, timeless verbs that connect high abstractions
with each other?4
Gilligan’s argument is, however, not without its problems. First,
the way in which she proclaims the different voice to be a distinctly
feminine attribute (a different voice) is problematic. Catharine Mac-
Kinnon (1987), a proponent of radical feminism, accuses Gilligan of
merely reinforcing gender stereotypes and warns that emphasising
difference (at all costs) could foreclose some possibilities. MacKinnon
argues that sexuality is socially constructed in order to keep the gender
hierarchy intact, and that Gilligan is doing much to aid this. To Mac-
Kinnon the only difference that requires serious attention is a differ-
4 Compare Hannah Arendt (quoted by Luban 1990: 239): “No philosophy, no
analysis, no aphorism, be it ever so profound, can compare in intensity and rich-
ness of meanings with a properly told story”. Also, Patricia Williams (1989a:
2148): “I think silence is too common, too institutionalized, and too destruc-
tive not to examine it in the most nuanced way possible”.
  
ence in power. In a later work MacKinnon (1989: 219) claims, indi-
rectly referring to Gilligan:
Difference is the velvet glove on the iron fist of domination [...] [t]he
problem then is not that differences are not valued; the problem is
that they are defined by power.
Secondly, Gilligan seems to assume, too quickly, that the logic of
justice and the ethic of care are necessarily opposed. Moreover,
Diprose (1994) is concerned that Gilligan is too willing to surrender
the logic of justice as “male”, ignoring possible positive elements in
this approach. Perhaps the two opposite “poles” can instead form a
dynamic interaction. Together they may force a continual redescription
of what justice and law entail. A more “generous” reading of Gilligan
could propose that she does not reject the ideas of the “logic of
justice” altogether, but only that understanding of justice which ig-
nores the importance of relationships and context.
Gilligan could also be criticised for underestimating the import-
ance of difference. Carol Stack (1986) notes that Gilligan’s argument
does not hold for the black community in the USA. In this commu-
nity men also place great emphasis on relationships with others.5 She
argues that this understanding is not the result of gender, but rather
of economic deprivation. The category of women, to which Gilligan
ascribes the different voice, is itself a diverse group, something she
does not acknowledge. Diprose (1994) raises the concern that Gilligan
does not take the complexity of (sexual) difference seriously enough.
Are these differences natural or socially constituted, and can they be
generalised?
Gilligan comes close to essentialising the voice of care, attributing
it solely to women. But, as Kerber (1986: 308-9) points out, women
fail — as often as men — to challenge a calculated ethic of justice
with the ethic of care. She gives two examples. First, American women,
after being “granted” the vote, voted according to race and class, not
gender. They did not unify into a different voice or highlight new in-
terests. Secondly, in oppressive societies such as Nazi Germany,
7
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5 Stack (1974) developed these ideas in All our kin: strategies for survival in a Black
community. She describes the role that community networks and a co-operative
lifestyle play (a form of connectedness).
     
8
Acta Academica 2004: 36(3)
women failed to disrupt the dominant ethic of their society — they
were as militant Nazis as their male counterparts. For example, they
were in favour of eugenics and the German Women Doctors’ organi-
sation expelled Jews from its ranks.
MacKinnon (1987) argues vehemently that the idea of caring en-
trenches gender stereotypes. Moreover, as Noddings (1993) points
out, caring can lead to self-sacrifice (by women). This claim could be
countered by two arguments. First, following Noddings (1993: 387-
8), the ethic of care is not intended as an ethic for women only, and
it should be used precisely to undermine the ethic of dominance. Se-
condly, Derrida’s criticism of Levinas could also be useful here (cf
Derrida 1978). Just as the Self should not become the slave of the
Other, care should not swallow the “care-giver” whole. There is still
a moment of sameness, reciprocity and mutual responsibility.
Responding to criticism, in an article written after the publication
of In a different voice, Gilligan (1987: 24-5) argues that care should be
understood within the framework of justice, as something that
tempers justice and emphasises respect for people on their own terms.
In an even earlier article she states:
[T]hrough the tension between the universality of rights and
particularity of responsibility, between the abstract concept of justice
as fairness and the more contextual understanding of care in relation-
ships, these ethics keep one another alive and inform each other on
critical points [...] In this sense, the concept of morality sustains a
dialectical tension between justice and care, aspiring always toward
the ideal of a world more caring and more just (Gilligan 1983: 47).
This constitutes a realisation of the complexity of context, that
individuals are not atomistic units, but stand in relation to others.
Their decisions and judgments can have far-reaching consequences
— some of which are not intended, but for which they still need to
take responsibility. It is a realisation that matters of justice are not
merely calculations in a sphere of competing demands and rights,
but involve concrete individuals and singular situations. As Gilligan
(1977: 483) points out:
The blind willingness to sacrifice people to truth [...] has always
been the danger of an ethics abstracted from life [...] This
willingness links Gandhi to Abraham.
    
Gilligan (1980: 241) argues that the absolute nature of the principles
of the logic of justice coexists with feelings of intolerance, since they
do not take concreteness or consequences into account.
It could thus be argued that Gilligan’s work represents an import-
ant move in the debate on justice, law and ethics. She defends herself
against the accusation that she attributes the characteristic of a “Dif-
ferent Voice” to women, in an essentialist manner by saying “I saw in
women’s thinking the lines of a different conception, grounded in
different images of relationships and implying a different interpretive
framework” (Gilligan 1986: 326). She also notes:
[T]he title of my book was deliberate; it reads, ‘in a different voice,
not ‘in a woman’s voice’ [...] this voice is identified not by gender but
by theme (Gilligan 1986: 327; emphasis original).
She points out that Amy’s different perspective on the Heinz example
is not only rendered incomprehensible by Kohlberg’s framework, but
also devalued as “under-development” (Gilligan 1986: 329).6 One of
Gilligan’s most important contributions, writes Cornell (1991: 136),
[...] was not that the form of moral reasoning correlated with women’s
emphasis on care as opposed to rights thinking should be hailed as in-
herently better, but only that a woman’s different voice should not be
inherently inferior.
In other words, by valuing the different voice, Gilligan forces a rede-
scription of what counts as ethical decision-making.
This concludes the outline of Gilligan’s position. The table below
provides a brief summary of the main differences between the ethic
of care and the logic of justice. In the paragraphs which follow it will
argued that her idea of an ethic of care could be supplemented in an
9
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6 Beverly Thiele (1986), identifies three “vanishing acts” in which issues involving
women are excluded from political and social thought. This, of course, holds
true for other groups (eg blacks, Jews — members of the non-WASP group).
The three strategies are exclusion, pseudo-inclusion and alienation. This is achie-
ved through decontextualisation (abstracting from real people, real activities
and events in order to make generalisations about ‘Man’, ‘Society’ and so on —
in other words, essentialising categories that are violent to difference), univer-
salism (which obscures the value-laden nature of the concepts), naturalism,
dualism (which creates a value-laden hierarchy), propriation and reversal (by
which women’s activities are denigrated and trivialised) (Thiele 1986: 35-8).
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interesting way with concepts from complexity theory, specifically
the implications of complexity for our understanding of ethics.
Table 1: The differences between the ethic of care and the logic of justice
Ethic of care Logic of justice
Relationships Rules
Interdependence and connections Autonomous individual
Decision Calculation
Responsibility Duty
Responsibility and respect Rights and formal equality 
Context Formal rights and rules
2. Complexity, boundaries and ethics
Social systems are complex, thus they embody the characteristics of
complex systems in general.7 The nature of a complex system is
determined by a large number of elements that interact in a dynamic
and non-linear fashion. There are many loops and feedback paths in
these interactions. Furthermore, complex systems are open, operating
under conditions far from equilibrium. They interact with their en-
vironments, and it is therefore difficult to determine their boundaries.
The identity and actions of a system are constituted through patterns
of interaction, not by fixed or a priori components. Because of its non-
linearity, an accurate description of such a system would entail a
detailed description of every single interaction, an impossible task for
finite beings to perform. Although one can discover general patterns,
the whole system cannot be described without running into difficul-
ties. A complex system cannot be replaced with an equivalent system
that is simpler — complexity is incompressible (Cilliers 1998: 9-10).
These characteristics are also reflected in society (Cilliers 1995:
129-30; 1998: 119-23). A society consists of an enormous number of
individuals who interact constantly in many different capacities.
There is constant activity, and different groups interpret both infor-
mation and history differently. Society is an open system made up of
many layers, the meaning of which is not pre-ordained but in con-
stant transformation. (Cilliers 1998: 42-3).
7 Cf Cilliers 1995 & 1998 for detail.
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At this point it is important to emphasise that an acknowledge-
ment of the complexity of society does not imply that it is chaotic.
Acknowledging complexity is not an argument against structure,
boundaries, rules or laws as such. However, one has to acknowledge
that any description of a system or structure will necessarily be in-
complete, given the incompressibility of a complex system. This does
not mean that the effort to create structure and meaning is a senseless
activity; it just means that such activities have limited success.
Davies (1996) remarks on the importance of the notions of limits
and boundaries in the social context. They are, she argues, an end to
thought, action and even the way in which we define ourselves (Davies
1996: 13). They limit thought since “something is there preventing
us from thinking that”. This inhibits our ability to take action, since
our thought, which runs into these limits, makes us see the world in
a certain way. Limits also define what we are and how we behave (Davies
1996: 14). They are paths, argues Davies, “that we follow to determine
our existences” (Davies 1996: 15). They not only define what counts
as acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, but what it is to be human.
Limits and boundaries, according to Davies (1996: 14) are thus
not purely negative:8 “The limit gives us a place to begin, a place to
put our thoughts, a place to proceed and a place to make conclusions”.
The limit is also a call to action and an invitation to think beyond
(Davies 1996: 14). In other words, we have a responsibility to trans-
gress limits, which is at the same time both a necessity and an impos-
sibility. Furthermore, as Davies points out, to transgress a limit does
not destroy it, but may have consequences (Davies 1996: 16). It can,
however, create space for transformation and, perhaps, even a moment
of justice. The call to action is embedded, writes Davies (1996: 14),
in the idea of a limit: “The limit [...] in some instances [...] empowers
us to act and to be”.
The (ethical) importance of both a sensitivity to complexity and
a need for boundaries — which has a specific relevance for the ten-
sion in Gilligan’s argument between the logic of justice and the ethic
of care — is reflected in Derrida’s argument on the difference between
law and justice.
8 Cf Cilliers 2001 for a similar discussion in the context of complex systems.
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3. The law versus justice
Derrida’s (1992) understanding of justice differs from traditional
theories of justice — for example, those of Rawls (1971), Nozick
(1974) and Walzer (1983) — where the emphasis is primarily on
abstract rights and procedures that (are hoped to) guarantee justice.
By contrast, Derrida argues for the impossibility and the urgency of
justice. An important aspect of his argument is the way in which he
contrasts law and justice.
Derrida’s argument is complex and only its main points can be
discussed here. The law can be seen as a system of rules and therefore
assumes the “generality” of a rule, a norm or a universal imperative
(Derrida 1992: 17). The law consists of “the positive structures that
make up judicial systems [...] that in virtue of which actions are said
to be legal, legitimate, or properly authorized” (Derrida & Caputo
1997: 130). Justice, however, cannot be bound to a “system”; it exceeds
the limits of the system, or, more correctly, disrupts (or deconstructs)
the system by demanding from it that which it cannot provide.9
Justice is, therefore, concerned with critically and continually rede-
scribing the boundaries of a system. Law needs the boundaries to be
set, otherwise it would not be law; justice cannot live with bounda-
ries/limits that proclaim themselves to be natural and fixed. The
main foci of the law — not unlike Gilligan’s description of the logic
of justice — are rules and the calculation between rights and duties.
By contrast, there is a similarity between Derrida’s understanding of
justice and Gilligan’s ethic of care in that both place emphasis on
context, singularity and the importance of relationships between in-
dividuals and groups.
One of the most important aspects of Derrida’s argument, how-
ever, is the that the relationship between law and justice is not an
either/or choice. Law is problematic and violent, but we still need it
since we cannot reinvent strategies to cope with (rather than control)
the complexity of the world every day. Above all, justice needs law.
In other words, while natural law can argue that if there is an unjust
law we can simply disregard it, and bank on justice to save us, things
9 Justice, declares Derrida (1992: 14-5), is deconstruction. Cornell (1992: 1) re-
defines deconstruction as “the philosophy of the limit”.
  
are more complex to Derrida. The complex relationship between law
and justice is an aporetic one: law and justice, even if they contradict
each other, need each other.
Similarly, it could be argued that the ethic of care and the logic
of justice need not stand in opposition to one another, but can rather
enrich each other. The ethic of care needs to consider rules and rights
in order not to sink into a fuzzy, feel-good approach; the logic of
justice can be tempered by the ethic of care’s emphasis on context and
relationships between people.
To summarise: There is a gap between law and justice, and yet they
need each other. Justice cannot be content without law; law would be
a monster without justice. It is justice’s concern with singularity, with
irreplaceable individuals and with groups that leads us to its impossi-
bility, to the aporia of its relationship with law. The aporetic relation-
ship between law and justice is the “result” not only of the emphasis
on singularity, but also of the need for justice to be “applied”. There-
fore, Derrida’s understanding of justice (and law) leaves us with a
challenge, a call to action and, above all, a renewed emphasis on the
importance of choices and responsibility. This brings us to the pos-
sible relevance of Gilligan’s ethic of care.
4. The relevance of the ethic of care
The ethic of care emphasis that society consists of complex relation-
ships between individuals, and is therefore too complex to be thought
of solely in terms of rights and procedures. Such rights and proce-
dures assume universalism and abstract individuals, but also pretend
to be neutral concepts. As Baier (1987: 49-50) points out:
The moral tradition that developed the concept of rights [...] is the
same tradition that provided the justifications of the oppression of
those whom the primary right-holders depended on to do the sort
of work they themselves preferred not to do.
In other words, the genealogy of rights should not be ignored. Baier
points to one aspect of the problems related to an emphasis on rights,
namely the “generosity” that accompanies the “granting” of rights of
marginalised groups (blacks, women, etc). These groups are “granted”
(de iure) rights by groups/individuals in the superior position not in
13
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order to empower the marginalised, but to strengthen their own
power positions by a moment of benevolence.
Gilligan’s plea for an ethic of care also highlights many of the pro-
blems with rights. They are abstract and do not necessarily change
institutional contexts, and there is a gap between de iure rights and de
facto injustice. Gabel & Harris (1989: 304), two critical legal studies
scholars, make an important point:
[T]he great weakness of a rights-oriented legal practice is that it
does not address itself to a central precondition for building a
sustained political movement — that of overcoming the psycholo-
gical conditions upon which both the power of the legal system and
the social hierarchy in general rest [...] in the long run it tends to
reinforce alienation and powerlessness, because the appeal to rights
inherently affirms that the source of social power resides in the state
rather than in the people themselves.
Gilligan (1980: 225) argues that the ethic of care highlights res-
ponsibility instead of over-emphasising abstract rights and is, there-
fore, also sensitive to context and consequences. The ethic of care “allows
for fine-grained judgments and discretionary responses to particular
persons in actual situations with distinctive histories” (Walker 1997:
64). Her argument is not a attack on the idea of rights, but rather a
plea that rights are enacted (or not) within a specific context. Fur-
thermore, ethical decision-making cannot merely be reduced to a cal-
culation between rights since it, most importantly, involves human
beings — or, to quote Derrida (1992: 17) “singularity, individuals
[… and] irreplaceable groups and lives”.
Furthermore, the idea of an ethic of care carries with it a greater
willingness to be open to particularity. It is not without its problems.
Gilligan has been accused — by MacKinnon (1987) and Noddings
(1993), for example — of reinforcing stereotypes and of underestima-
ting difference. The ethic of care, however, is (at the very least) a
move in the direction of complexity and responsibility — aspects
that are lacking in “the logic of justice”. The emphasis that the ethic
of care places on responsibility (not duty) and the interdependence of
human beings could be an interesting way of approaching ethics in a
complex social system. In a complex system the interactions are dy-
namic, rich and mutually influential. Furthermore, these interactions
are non-linear, meaning that they cannot be collapsed into a smaller
14
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system. Also, small causes can have large effects and vice versa. Gilli-
gan’s plea for the importance of context and relationships between
people thus links well with this approach.
It should also be pointed out that Gilligan argues that the logic of
justice and the ethic of care need not be mutually exclusive, but they
can inform each other in a powerful way. Gilligan (1982: 173-4) writes:
Just as the language of responsibilities provides a web-like imagery
of relationships to replace a hierarchical ordering that dissolves with
the coming of equality, so the language of rights underlines the im-
portance of including in the network of care not only the other but
also the self [...] by positing instead two different modes, we arrive
at a more complex rendition of human experience.
The disruptive force of the ethic of care — as a “redefinition of the
social vocabulary” — should not be underestimated. It should not be
understood as merely emotion or “nice warm feelings”, but as a move
away from seeing problems of justice as maths problems with human
beings in them, a move away from calculation towards an “inherent”
sensitivity to the complexity of society and the relationships between
people within it. An important part of Gilligan’s work, which Diprose
(1994: 11) acknowledges, is that it is a move away from the concept
of the atomised individual and towards a renewed understanding of
responsibility and care as well as of the importance of social context
and singularity. The ethic of care challenges narrow conceptions of
ethics, and is a move in the direction of the content given to it by
Cornell (1992: 12), namely, the quest for a non-violative relationship
with the Other.
To summarise: Gilligan’s ethic of care — as a challenge to the
logic of justice — ties in with a view of society as a complex system.
Complexity places emphasis on rich, dynamic interaction; the ethic
of care with its emphasis on context and relationships provides a way
of taking this dynamic interaction into account in ethical decision-
making. A complex system cannot be collapsed into a simpler de-
scription, for technical and ethical reasons; the ethic of care highlights
the fact that ethical decision-making cannot be reduced to a calcula-
tion of rights. Where does this leave the status of rules and laws? If
complexity is taken seriously and read together with the ethic of care,
rules and laws remain important. We do not reinvent the world every
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day, and laws provide a powerful tool to protect the vulnerable. How-
ever, rules and laws do not operate in a vacuum; they function within
a complex society, where the ethic of care, informed by the logic of
justice, can provide a creative way of dealing with ethical decision-
making.
5. Conclusion
If one takes the notion of society as a complex system seriously, then
the relationships and dynamic interactions between individuals become
increasingly important. So too does the realisation that rules and ab-
stract principles, although important, do not lead to ethical decision-
making. Complexity places emphasis on the multitude of relationships
that exist within society. The ethic of care emphasises the role of these
relationships in ethical dilemmas, refusing to override their importance
by reference to rules and rights. Both complexity and the ethic of care
give renewed value to the importance of choice and responsibility by
arguing that there is no way of calculating an ethical choice by
merely using rights and rules.
Gilligan’s most important contribution lies in her challenge to
the logic of justice, in other words, ethical reasoning on an abstract
level, as the correct form or highest level of ethical decision-making.
The ethic of care points out that considering the relationships between
people and the context in which they find themselves are as important
as the abstract rights and principles at stake. It highlights the fact
that moral dilemmas and ethical decision-making are more than a
“math problem with humans in” (Gilligan 1982: 28). Ethical decision-
making should never amount to a calculation between rights and
rules; it should, to quote Derrida (1992: 27-8), be haunted by the
ghost of the undecidable.
Does this imply that the logic of justice is useless or, worse still,
unethical? Gilligan herself denies that the ethic of care and the logic
of justice are mutually exclusive. If one explores the concept of jus-
tice in view of the “content” that Derrida gives to the concept, it
becomes clear that both approaches are not only useful, but vital to
ethical decision-making and the quest for a more just society. Derrida
(1992: 10-1) writes that justice is useless without the “teeth” of law,
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meaning — to put it rather bluntly — that good intentions are never
enough, and that part of the difficulty of justice is that we need the
violence of law to implement it. An ethic of care alone, therefore, can
never be enough. It can alert us to the complexity of justice and the
dynamic interaction between individuals, but care alone cannot answer
the call to justice, or do much about injustice.
Perhaps, in sum, the enduring importance of Gilligan’s ethic of care
lies in the insight that ethics is, above all, concerned with humane,
non-violative relationships between human beings.
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